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ABSTRACT 
This study addresses two questions: 1) What is the future role for SF in the Long 
War Strategy; and 2) How will the roles and missions of SF have a strategic impact or 
high utility function in this current fight and in our future endeavors?  This thesis asserts 
that the future role for Special Forces soldiers rests in a permanent OCONUS presence 
and engagement, so that SF teams can leverage and refine their unique skills, to include 
gaining a more comprehensive and deeper understanding of the regions in which they can 
be expected to operate. 
The arguments presented in this thesis are conceptual in nature, and are designed 
to offer the DoD an alternative approach for persistent presence and engagement.  What I 
am advocating with this argument is a complete and total career commitment to living 
abroad.  SF Groups in their entirety would be forward deployed OCONUS.  The roles 
and posture of SF would change, but the seven primary missions would remain the same.  
If, as so many people argue, the U.S. needs to move forward with a smaller footprint, a 
forward-deployed SF would give us a permanent global posture of strategic 
significance—and one that would certainly help us prosecute the Long War more 
effectively.   
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As always, people, not technology, will make the difference…in short, we 
have to invest in the human capital that is the real key to future warfare.1 
—Thomas X. Hammes 
A. HYPOTHETICAL/COUNTERFACTUAL 
The American container ship gently rocked on the ocean waves.  The night was 
silent and dark as the ship moved steadily through the Gulf of Guinea.  Out of the 
darkness, muzzle-flashes from automatic weapons and RPGs rained in from both the port 
and starboard sides of the undefended vessel.  No hits were immediately registered as 
these were clearly fired as a demonstration of force.  Grappling hooks immediately 
clanged against the large ship’s sides, soon followed by a set of men making their way 
over the railing.  In a methodical and professional manner, these men moved about the 
ship, securing the bridge, engine room and crew quarters.  Without weapons or the 
ability to resist, the ship’s crew was in the very capable hands of seasoned criminals 
within minutes of their boarding.  The Captain was barely able to send a short duress 
call over the satellite radio prior to being subdued: “Mayday, Mayday, Mayday this is 
cargo ship XYZ, position latitude −5.309766/ longitude −1.801758, I require immediate 
assistance, we are being raided by pirates; I say again, we are being raided by pirates!” 
Destined for Port Harcourt, carrying humanitarian assistance and emergency 
relief for several central African countries, the ship was now steered to an undisclosed 
region off the coast of Africa.  
In April of 2009, Somali pirates made two such attempts on American vessels in 
the Indian Ocean, but both such attempts were quickly thwarted.  The first hijacking 
received the immediate attention of the U.S. Navy, as the captain of one of the vessels 
was taken hostage, (the first such instance of an American taken hostage by pirates in 
                                                 
1  Thomas X. Hammes, “Rethinking the Principles of War: The Future of Warfare,” Rethinking the 
Principles of War, ed. Anthony D. McIvor (Annapolis, MD, Naval Institute Press, 2005), 277. 
 2
about 200 years).2  Interdiction by U.S. SOF assets resulted in the death of three of the 
four pirates who had threatened to kill the American captain.  The second attempted 
hijacking was quickly averted thanks to the proactive crew.  Following both failed 
attempts and the loss of pirate lives at the hand of U.S. forces, the pirates decreed that 
they would seek revenge and vowed to kill U.S. sailors.   
After this latest pirate attack in the Gulf of Guinea, on the other side of the 
continent, AFRICOM is immediately alerted and goes into crisis response mode.  
Contingencies have been planned and shelved for years, but with the current force 
disposition in Iraq and Afghanistan, limited SOF capabilities now factor into the 
equation.  With very little knowledge about Western Africa, and strained resources 
coupled with a lack of situational awareness about pirates on the coast, AFRICOM has 
limited options regarding any role it can play in the fate of the 26 American civilians held 
captive.  All anyone can do is sit and wait to hear from the pirates.  
 
I will now offer an alternative option to illustrate what might have transpired had 
U.S. Special Forces (SF) been operating abroad in the manner I propose in this thesis—
with a permanent presence and engagement role.  For instance, SF soldiers permanently 
residing and working with the Nigerian military would have developed contacts and 
relationships throughout the country.  Information gathered and shared in this forum 
either would have prevented the entire catastrophe from occurring in the first place, or at 
a minimum would have opened back door intelligence channels so that more information 
could have quickly been gathered, (e.g., status and location of personnel/ship, points of 
contact for negotiations, etc.).   
SF personnel operating throughout the country would have been in an excellent 
position to execute any type of time sensitive operation necessary to recover the crew.  
SF soldiers could have assisted with the establishment of a forward staging base for 
alternate personnel should they have been needed to carry out advanced negotiations and 
rescue operations.  But, of course, the aim of a forward deployed permanent presence of 
                                                 
2  Mark Tran, “Somali Pirates Seize Ship and U.S. Crew Off Horn of Africa,” 8 April 2009.  
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/apr/08/somali-pirates-ship-hijack (accessed 22 April 2009). 
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SF should be to help prevent the need for any such contingency responses.  Ideally, the 
Nigerians—after working with SF for years—would have been sufficiently well-
equipped and trained to thwart the attack themselves.  Or, even better, no such attack 
would have occurred.  Knowing the skill and competency of a Nigerian military that was 
partnered with the U.S., the pirates wouldn’t have dared attack a ship anywhere in 
Nigeria’s vicinity.  
The U.S. National Defense Strategy has fundamentally shifted from focusing 
solely on conventional conflicts between superpowers to now having to address 
asymmetric regional threats.  Our current enemies, terrorists and extremists alike, are 
predominately stateless.  The prominence of these non-state actors, asymmetric threats, 
and the potential spread of violent radical extremism demand a change in U.S. policy and 
method of approach.  It is said our challenge now is to develop counter-networks to 
monitor, disrupt, isolate and destroy these violent radicals.3  Accordingly, this thesis 
asserts that the future role for Special Forces soldiers rests in a permanent 
OCONUS presence and engagement role, so that SF teams can leverage and refine their 
unique skills, to include gaining a more comprehensive understanding of the regions in 
which they can be expected to operate.4 
The arguments presented in this thesis are conceptual in nature, and are designed 
to offer the DoD an alternative approach for persistent presence and engagement.  What I 
am advocating with this argument for the permanent presence of SF soldiers is a 
complete and total career commitment to living abroad.  SF Groups in their entirety 
would be forward deployed OCONUS.  The roles and posture of SF would change, but 
the seven primary missions would remain the same.  If, as so many people argue, the U.S. 
needs to move forward with a smaller footprint, then forward deployed SF would give us 
a permanent global posture of strategic significance—and one that would certainly help 
us prosecute the Long War more effectively.   
                                                 
3  USSOCOM Posture Statement 2006, (accessed 19 February 2009). 
http://www.socom.mil/Docs/2006%20USSOCOM%20Posture%20Statement%20final.pd 
4  OCONUS is a common acronym in the military, representing territories “Outside the Continental 
United States.” 
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B. THESIS OUTLINE 
Having identified the central argument of this thesis, Chapter II will begin with an 
overview, addressing the notion of combating a global insurgency.  This chapter will lay 
the groundwork for the main argument to come.  Chapter II will take a brief look back at 
the historical application of forces that had a purposeful presence in their time, detailing 
accounts from the early exploits of the OSS and looking even further back to the 
successful use of Native Americans.  A summary explanation of SF’s current roles and 
missions is also necessary to establish the framework for the road ahead.    
Chapter III contains the main argument of the thesis and explains the need for 
shifting from a persistent presence to a permanent presence.  Working by, with, and 
through host-nation forces for extended periods of time will allow the necessary trust and 
influence to develop between both parties that is so essential to combating the global 
insurgency identified in Chapter II.  Chapter III will recommend an alternative approach 
for employing Army Special Forces—deployed forward in a permanent OCONUS 
presence and engagement role.   
In Chapter IV, I identify the type of soldier or family that would fit this permanent 
presence role.  Such a deployment shift raises questions about our current selection 
process and where it would need to be changed or altered.  Additionally, Chapter IV 
details how this permanent presence function will fulfill the Security Force Assistance 
(SFA) requirements, as Special Operations Command (SOCOM) has recently been 
designated the military-wide proponent for such operations.  
Chapter V presents a conceptual framework for how SF Groups would be 
employed given my proposed new network of global coverage.  It examines the future 
force structure and mission focus for each SF Group, taking into consideration the 
projected future growth and size of the force.  Two Groups will be placed under the 
microscope to examine how they would deploy into three target countries within their 
Area of Responsibility (AOR).      
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Chapter VI concludes with comments about the need to re-focus our strategic 
efforts for a force postured in the manner suggested throughout this thesis.  It is my intent 
that by the end of this thesis the reader should be, if not convinced, at least appreciative, 
of an alternative option for the strategic utilization of Army Special Forces.  Special 
Forces are a strategic asset, trained and equipped with a strategic purpose.  Understanding 
that the greatest military threat we currently face is the growing global insurgency, 
deploying SF permanently forward in a presence and engagement role could offer us one 
of our best means for combating this insurgency. 
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II. STRATEGIC UTILIZATION OF SPECIAL FORCES 
An increasing global presence and focus, enhanced SOF warrior 
capabilities, and growing international and interagency coordination all 
combine to form SOF’s direction for the future.5 
—USSOCOM Posture Statement (2006) 
A. OVERVIEW 
The War on Terror (WOT) is not a state-centric war, but more rightly described as 
a global counterinsurgency campaign.6  The entanglement of the U.S. in this Irregular 
Warfare (IW) environment, in which we see a combination of insurgency, terrorism, and 
transnational crime, is both new and extremely daunting.  The involvement of Special 
Operations Forces (SOF), specifically Special Forces, has never been more important: 
“The military organization most capable of conducting Unconventional Warfare (UW), 
and the only organization with a record of success in UW, is U.S. Army Special Forces, 
especially in combination with Civil Affairs, and Psyops assets.”7   
This study addresses two questions: 1) What is the future role for SF in the Long 
War Strategy; and 2) How will the roles and missions of SF have a strategic impact or 
high utility function in this current fight and our future endeavors?  This thesis asserts 
that the future role of Special Forces soldiers rests in a permanent OCONUS presence 
and engagement, where they can leverage their unique skills, to include a comprehensive 
understanding of the local customs and culture. 
                                                 
5  USSOCOM Posture Statement 2006,. 
http://www.socom.mil/Docs/2006%20USSOCOM%20Posture%20Statement%20final.pd (accessed 19 
February 2009).  
6  The ‘War on Terror’ phrase has lost its panache with the new administration.  According to 
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, “The administration has stopped using the phrase, and I think that speaks 
for itself.”  Jay Solomon, “U.S. Drops ‘War on Terror’ Phrase, Clinton Says,” The Wall Street Journal, 31 
March 2009.  I continue to utilize the phrase in this thesis as it is prevalent throughout most of the literature 
I am citing, there has been nothing new articulated by the present administration, and the term is still being 
used in military circles, (May 2009).  Our current Secretary of Defense, Robert Gates, wrote recently 
(January/February 2009) in Foreign Affairs, “What is dubbed the war on terrorism, in grim reality, is a 
prolonged, worldwide, irregular campaign—a struggle between the forces of violent extremism and those 
of moderation.” 
7  Thomas K. Adams, US Special Operation Forces in Action: The Challenge of Unconventional 
Warfare (London/Portland, OR: Frank Cass Publishers, 1998) 302. 
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Dr. David Kilcullen ascribes to the notion, one with which I completely agree, 
that we are facing a global insurgency.  Through the use of terrorism and other violent 
and invasive tactics, elements of Salafi-Takfiri (Sunni) and Khomeinist (Shia) terrorist 
groups are attempting to establish a new world order informed by radical and extremist 
Islamic fundamentalism.8  These groups utilize a diffuse network of cells whereby they 
disseminate their tactics, techniques, procedures, and funding around the globe in an 
attempt to establish an Islamic Caliphate and combat Western ideals.  “Islamist 
movements appear to function through regional ‘theaters of operation’ where operatives 
cooperate, or conduct activities in neighboring countries.”9   
If we allow the aggregation of these cells, and permit them to continue to operate 
openly, thereby sowing seeds of distrust and promoting violent conflict, the global 
insurgency will continue to grow and flourish.  Although cooperation may exist in the 
sense that terrorists share close geographical ties, they nonetheless lack a centralized 
hierarchal command structure.  According to Kilcullen, “A strategy of disaggregation 
would attack this operational method by breaking the links that allow the jihad to 
function as a global entity.”10  Because jihadists count on the overall strategic effect of 
numerous tactical actions dispersed across time and space, severing the head will not end 
this global insurgency; there is no head.  Instead, we need to confront this insurgency on 
a regional level, employing forces across the globe. 
Our current enemy, comprised of terrorists and extremists alike, is predominately 
stateless.  The prominence of non-state actors, asymmetric threats and the potential 
spread of violent radical extremism consequently demand a change in U.S. policy and in 
our method of approach.  Although terrorist networks require a modicum of stability 
within a state to survive and function, the U.S. should not focus solely on terrorist states, 
                                                 
8  Robert O. Work, VP for Strategic Studies with the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 
identifies these two non-state groups as the most prominent terrorist organizations threatening global 
security.  “The Future Security Environment: Multidimensional Challenges in a Multi-Player World,” 21 
August 2008.  
http://www.csbaonline.org/4Publications/PubLibrary/S.20080820.Future_Security_En/S.20080820.Future_
Security_En.pdf (accessed 16 January 2009). 
9  David J. Kilcullen, Strategy and Terrorism: Countering Global Insurgency, The Journal of Strategic 
Studies, Vol. 28, No. 4, August 2005, 597–617. 
10  Ibid. 
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but rather on the terrorist networks that come together to form the global insurgency 
confronting us.  One way to achieve this would be through the global deployment of 
forces in a permanent presence and engagement role—a strategic mission for SF soldiers.  
Historically, the United States has taken a ‘state-centric’ view when it comes to 
fighting wars, identifying the enemy with a particular nation-state.  Japan, Germany, and 
Korea all serve as examples of countries where battles were waged with successful 
outcomes against a well-defined nation-state enemy.  In Vietnam, the U.S. witnessed its 
first loss/withdrawal as it tried to fight a state-on-state style war against what some argue 
was an ideology (namely communism).  One could make the same argument for our 
involvement in Lebanon and Somalia; in neither instance were we fighting another 
nation-state.  Similar failures have been noted in the first few years of Operation Iraqi 
Freedom (OIF), and while some of these setbacks have been corrected, we face ever 
increasing and similar challenges in Afghanistan.  The global counterinsurgency 
campaign we are currently waging is a nation-state vs. network battle—a fight which will 
demand the protracted involvement of U.S. forces.11  I contend that the preponderance of 
these personnel should come from the Special Forces.  
The National Defense Strategy (June 2008) places the future focus of the 
Department of Defense (DoD) squarely on the ‘Long War’ approach to combating 
extremism throughout the world.   
Ungoverned, under-governed, misgoverned, and contested areas offer 
fertile ground for [insurgent groups/non-state actors] to exploit the gaps in 
governance capacity of local regimes to undermine local stability and 
regional security.  Addressing this problem will require local partnerships 
and creative approaches to deny extremists the opportunity to gain 
footholds.12   
                                                 
11  The “network” construct that our current enemy is operating under has been advanced by many 
respected academics and authors.  For further reading on networks, see John Arquilla and David F. 
Ronfeldt, Networks and Netwars: The Future of Terror, Crime, and Militancy (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 
2001); Marc Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania 
Press, 2004).  Consider also the book by Thomas Hammes, The Sling and the Stone: On War in the 21st 
Century (St. Paul, MN: Zenith Press, 2004).    
12  National Defense Strategy, June 2008.  (Emphasis added by author). 
www.defenselink.mil/news/2008%20National%20Defense%20Strategy.pdf (accessed 10 January 2009). 
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Lessons learned in Iraq and Afghanistan rate Islamist extremist ideologies above 
conventional challenges posed by both China and Russia.  “U.S. dominance in 
conventional warfare has given prospective adversaries, particularly non-state actors and 
their state sponsors, strong motivation to adopt asymmetric methods to counter our 
advantages. For this reason, we must display a mastery of irregular warfare comparable 
to that which we possess in conventional combat.”13  The asymmetric challenges we face 
today are sufficiently urgent and complex that they warrant that the bulk of U.S. strategic 
efforts be placed in the hands of the SOF community due to SOF’s adeptness at dealing 
with complexity in irregular environments. 
Since 2001, there have been many comparisons made between the threats we 
faced with communism and the threat of violent extremism in the Middle East and around 
the globe today.  As a military and as a nation, we must bridge the information and 
culture gaps that exist regarding the global operating environment.  Just as a Long War 
strategy was applied to the Cold War, the WOT clearly calls for something equally 
visionary if we intend to win.  Rear Admiral Bill Sullivan, the former Vice Director for 
Strategic Plans and Policy on the Joint Staff (J-5), lists four reasons why we need a Long 
War Strategy: 
1. The enemy is committed to his cause. He is prepared to fight to the death for 
what he believes is a defense of his religion. 
2. The enemy has a strategy with global aspirations. He estimates it will take him 
decades to accomplish his strategic objectives. 
3. It requires change within the Islamic world. Historically, such changes have 
taken centuries to occur.  
4. It requires increased partner nation capacity – armed forces, police, economic 
development, and good governance – to combat the violent extremist threat. 
Such growth takes decades to achieve.14 
 
                                                 
13  National Defense Strategy, June 2008.   
14  Bill Sullivan, “Fighting the Long War—Military Strategy for the War on Terrorism,” Executive 
Lecture Forum—Radvanyi Chair in International Security Studies, Mississippi State University, 
PowerPoint Presentation, Slide 3. www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/jcs/jcslongwar_12jan06_j5.pdf 
(accessed 10 January 2009). 
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Although the Cold War was waged against a political ideology, and the WOT is 
being fought against violent Islamist based extremism, the fact remains that a sustained 
American effort coupled with a significant investment of blood and treasure will be 
necessary to win.  As the USSOCOM Posture Statement for 2008 puts it, “There is no 
‘silver bullet’ for success, and—like the cold war—it will take a sustained, national effort 
over many years to achieve victory.”15   
B. BACKGROUND/HISTORY 
Modern day Army Special Forces trace their lineage back to the Office of 
Strategic Services (OSS) established by President Roosevelt just prior to World War II.  
This paramilitary agency, under the direction of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was placed 
under the leadership of William Donovan, a World War I hero and personal friend of the 
president.  The U.S., recognizing the necessary role it must play in the liberation of 
France, established a formal agreement to work with the British equivalent of the OSS—
the Special Operations Executive (SOE)—in a combined effort.  “Today’s Special Forces 
were based directly on the OSS experience, especially the aid to anti-German partisans in 
occupied territory proffered by small ‘Jedburgh’ teams and larger ‘Operational Groups’ 
fielded by that organization.”16  
In conjunction with the Normandy invasion, three-man elements—Jedburgh 
Teams—parachuted into France, Holland, and Belgium in support of Allied Forces.  Each 
team had a French national who was not necessarily a member of the Maquis (French 
armed Resistance fighters), but was a French-speaker who possessed the necessary 
language and cultural background to operate behind enemy lines.  These invaluable 
French volunteers earned immediate credibility from the local populace as they could 
empathize with the cause and seamlessly blend into the environment.  As General 
Eisenhower said of the Jedburghs: “The disruption of enemy rail communications, the 
                                                 
15  United States Special Operations Command Posture Statement: Right Place, Right Time, Right 
Adversary, 2006.  www.socom.mil/docs/2006%20ussocom%20posture%20statement%20final.pdf 
(accessed 10 January 2009). 
16  Thomas K. Adams, U.S. Special Operation Forces in Action: The Challenge of Unconventional 
Warfare, 34. 
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harassing of German road moves and the continual and increasing strain placed on the 
German war economy throughout occupied Europe by these organized forces of 
resistance played a very considerable part in our complete and final victory.”17  These 
teams supplied valuable reconnaissance, organized resistance movements, and executed 
countless covert operations, exemplifying the use of ‘Economy of Force’ for this period, 
with an obvious strategic utility and impact. 
Coastwatchers represent another example of the strategic importance of persistent 
presence and a willingness to adapt and understand local customs and languages.  
According to OSS Secretariat Walter Lord’s descriptions of the exploits of Donald 
Kennedy, Kennedy’s hilltop guerilla base at Segi, on the southeastern tip of New 
Georgia, was ideal for monitoring Japanese traffic throughout the area during World War 
II.  Given few assets but great latitude, Kennedy built a small but capable guerilla force 
that continually harassed the Japanese and provided valuable information to his higher 
headquarters.  Eventually, his efforts and the information he generated resulted in the 
strategic decision to build an airstrip on Segi to support deeper attacks into enemy 
territory.  As Lord concludes, “He [Donald Kennedy] belonged to a far smaller world 
built around personal loyalty, personal authority, personal initiative, personal contact.”18  
This type of personal loyalty and personal contact that Lord is alluding to can only be 
achieved through a dedicated and extended presence of forces.   
History is littered with examples of the benefits to be gained by working by, with 
and through indigenous or surrogate forces.  For example, long before World War I, the 
U.S. Government made use of American Indians to further its strategic aims.  After the 
Civil War, the U.S. Government found itself having to return to policing the ungoverned 
areas of the Western frontier, and used native Indian scouts to accomplish this mission.  
A lone Indian Scout unit was “six times” more valuable than the equivalent cavalry unit, 
as a consequence of: 1) the scouts’ ability to speak the language and understand the 
                                                 
17  Corey Ford and Alastair MacBain, Cloak and Dagger: The Secret Story of OSS (New York: 
Random House, 1945) 67. 
18  Walter Lord, Lonely Vigil (New York: Viking, 1977) From Troy to Entebbe: Special Operations in 
Ancient and Modern Times, ed. John Arquilla, (London/New York: University Press of America, 1996) 
273–274. 
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culture; 2) their knowledge of the terrain/area; 3) their knowledge of the local populace; 
and 4) the counterinsurgent usefulness of ‘fighting fire with fire’—using Indians to fight 
other Indians, a proven method for combating an insurgent enemy.19  In 1895, these scout 
units were incorporated into the Army with their own distinctive insignia—a device of 
crossed arrows, worn today by Special Forces soldiers. 
C. MISSION OF THE SPECIAL FORCES 
What, meanwhile, is so ‘special’ about Special Forces, and what are their roles 
and missions?  Academics, policymakers and even those within the SOF Community 
openly debate this question.  “These disagreements are reflective of a division of opinion 
within the special-ops community as to whether they [SF] ought to be shooters or social 
workers.”20   
Understanding what makes SF special, and then defining SF’s roles and missions, 
is essential to determining SF’s future significance.  Currently, SF is the primary lead for 
conducting UW, a vital WOT capability for use against both state and non-state actors.  
“SOF will really be the main DoD instrument, not necessarily the main U.S. Government 
instrument in all cases, but main DoD instrument in the longer term GWOT.”21   
According to FM 3–05 (Army Special Operations Forces), “Commanders employ 
SF to help attain strategic and operational objectives.”22  The typical SF soldier is flexible 
and comfortable operating in ambiguous environments.  He possesses unique skills that 
separate him from the common soldier, including, but not limited to: language 
proficiency, regional orientation, interpersonal capabilities, as well as cultural 
                                                 
19 James D. Campbell, Making Riflemen from Mud: Restoring the Army’s Culture of Irregular 
Warfare, (Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, PA) 7. 
20  Thomas K. Adams, US Special Operation Forces in Action: The Challenge of Unconventional 
Warfare, 8. 
21  Michael G. Vickers, current Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations/Low-Intensity 
Conflict and Interdependent Capabilities (SO/LIC&IC), was serving as a Senior Vice President for 
Strategic Studies, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA) and a senior advisor to the 2006 
Quadrennial Defense Review when he presented this statement at a hearing before the Terrorism, 
Unconventional Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services House of 
Representatives, 29 June 2006. 
22  FM 3-05 (FM 100–25), Army Special Operations Forces, September 2006, 3–5. 
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understanding through experience and in-depth study.  Linguistic abilities together with 
cultural competence are critical to gaining situational awareness and operational freedom 
for working with a tribe, in a society, or with varied groups in a region. 
In distinguishing between roles and missions: “The DoD defines military roles in 
legal terms as the broad and enduring purpose for which Congress established the 
services…, and missions as the more specific tasks assigned to the combatant 
commanders…”23  In other words, the role is the overall strategic purpose, and the 
mission is the specific means by which we execute that role.  Roles and missions are of 
particular importance because it is within this framework that units establish their identity 
and strategic significance or utility.  Roles and missions will change from time to time as 
is necessary given the ever changing operational environment, but when this occurs, the 
changes need to be clearly articulated and defined in order to maximize a unit’s impact 
on the outcome of a war or campaign.  
FM 3–05, the field manual that establishes doctrine for Army Special Operations 
Forces, requires Special Forces units to be capable of performing seven core tasks.  These 
are:   
Unconventional Warfare (UW) 
Foreign Internal Defense (FID) 
Special Reconnaissance (SR) 
Direct Action (DA) 
Combating Terrorism (CT) 
Counter-proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (CP of WMD) 
Information Operations (IO) 
 
As U.S. Special Forces Command notes, “These missions make Special Forces unique in 
the U.S. military, because they are employed throughout the three stages of the 
operational continuum: peacetime, conflict and war.”24   
My contention in this thesis will be that it is the ability of SF soldiers to operate 
across this continuum by, with, and through indigenous or surrogate forces that makes 
                                                 
23  David Tucker and Christopher J. Lamb, United States Special Operations Forces (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2007) 143.  
24  U.S. Army Special Forces Command (A) Fact Sheet, http://www.soc.mil/SF/factsheets.htm 
(accessed 10 January 2009) . 
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them truly unique and should enable them to fulfill the permanent presence and 
engagement role I will describe.  Furthermore, I would submit that six of the seven 
missions are a subset of the first—UW.  Conducting these six missions under the 
contextual framework of UW is what makes SF unlike any other unit; I say this because, 
outside of the UW umbrella, these missions [FID/DA/SR/CT/CP/and IO] are all being 
successfully executed by Conventional Forces (CF) today in both Iraq and Afghanistan.   
Unfortunately, the post-9/11 focus on capture/kill missions has pushed SF too 
heavily towards the kinetic/Direct Action (DA) style of operations, misusing SF’s role as 
a strategic asset and lowering it to a tactical level.  In an address to the Naval 
Postgraduate School, Admiral Olson, Commander of SOCOM, stated “Direct Action is 
important, not decisive; Indirect Action is decisive.”25  According to Max Boot, a Senior 
Fellow for National Security Studies, “SOCOM has become very focused on direct 
action, on rappelling out of helicopters, kicking down doors, taking out bad guys.”26  His 
main point (delivered in Congressional testimony) is that there are limitations to these 
types of operations or actions.  The ‘manhunter’ aspects of COIN and CT currently used 
in OIF and OEF, which result in the capture/kill of High Value Targets (HVTs), have 
unfortunately left in their wake a very capable and networked insurgency in both theaters.  
I would also add that in some cases this focus has actually helped fuel the insurgency.   
Currently, SF operate in a largely supporting role to the CF in OIF and OEF, 
which reduces them to an elite conventional, or ‘hyper-conventional’ force—neither one 
having a long-term strategic value or impact.27  The unilateral use of Army SF in OIF and 
OEF for the tactical capture/kill missions is a prime example of how to misuse a strategic 
asset.  There is a definite need for this capability, and the U.S. military has extremely 
capable SOF and conventional units to execute this task.  But it should not fall directly to 
                                                 
25  Eric T. Olson (Admiral), Commander—United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), 
Command Brief given to NPS Students and Faculty, 2 September 2008.  
26  Max Boot, Senior Fellow for National Security Studies, Council of Foreign Relations, presenting a 
statement at a hearing before the Terrorism, Unconventional Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee of the 
Committee on Armed Services House of Representatives, 29 June 2006. 
27  Hy S. Rothstein, Afghanistan & The Troubled Future of Unconventional Warfare, (Annapolis, MD: 
Naval Institute Press, 2006) 102.  Dr. Rothstein uses the term hyper-conventional to describe the type of 
units within the SOF community which specialize and focus the majority of their attention on the execution 
of Direct Action (DA) missions, (i.e., Special Mission Units (SMUs) and Rangers to name only two).    
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Army SF.  Nor should SF seek these missions.  Rather, in order to regain its strategic 
utility, SF must return to their roots of operating by, with and through an indigenous 
populace.  Regional immersion is necessary for regaining the necessary linguistic, 
cultural, and political sensitivities necessary to win this global fight.  The role and 
mission of SF does not lie in door-kicking.  DoD and SOCOM would be far better served 
were SF to be utilized as an independent strategic force instead.  
To summarize then, what I would submit makes SF special is that they represent 
an economy of force, trained and employed for use across the full spectrum of conflict 
with a strategic purpose.  They possess the ability to affect the socio-economic and 
political environments of a particular adversary, or ally.  They can do this, in part, by 
leveraging intelligence assets to solve problems which require a more artful or irregular 
approach.  In short, the SF soldier is a strategic asset, trained and equipped for strategic 
use.   
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III. NEW STRATEGY FOR THE LONG WAR 
You can’t commute to work.  A nuanced appreciation of local situations is 
essential to understanding the tribal structures, the power brokers, the 
good guys and the bad guys, local cultures and history.28 
—General David Petraeus 
A. THE ARGUMENT FOR PERSISTENT PRESENCE 
The future threat faced by the United States does not lie with a conventional foe 
on a two-way battlefield; globalization has assured us that the world is too interdependent 
and economically interconnected for that.  Both our military and our strategy need to shift 
and evolve as the world threat continually shifts and evolves.  According to Michael 
Vickers, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations/Low-Intensity 
Conflict and Interdependent Capabilities (SO/LIC&IC):  
I think the future of the long war or Global War on Terror will 
predominantly be persistent operations in countries with which the U.S. is 
not at war, leveraging  locals.  And so the key will be to have a distributed 
global presence where we are working with lots of locals to suppress this 
global insurgency down to very low levels.29   
In other words, according to those directing policy, the future demands a move towards a 
global posture with strategic significance.  The argument here is that Special Forces can 
serve in this capacity for the duration of the Long War.   
Operating under a very broad and overarching construct, the U.S. has historically 
used Conventional Military Operations (CMO) against an adversary’s armed forces to 
leverage our will regarding desired outcomes against the adversary’s government.  The 
effort of an Irregular Warfare (IW) campaign requires focusing on the local populace 
                                                 
28  Nicholas Kulish & Helene Cooper, “Holbrooke Says Afghan War ‘Tougher Than Iraq”, New York 
Times, 9 February 2009, 9.  General Petraeus is making the comment in reference to counterinsurgency and 
the uphill battle the U.S. faces in Afghanistan.   
29   Michael G. Vickers was serving as a Senior Vice President for Strategic Studies, Center for 
Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA) and a senior advisor to the 2006 Quadrennial Defense 
Review when he testified at a hearing before the Terrorism, Unconventional Threats and Capabilities 
Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services House of Representatives, 29 June 2006. 
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instead.30  The IW environment extends beyond the military domain to include political, 
diplomatic, economic, informational and psychological operations as methods that can be 
leveraged by military actions and forces.  Understanding that the indigenous populace is 
the center of gravity in a counterinsurgency is what drives the asymmetric fight.  “IW 
depends not just on our military prowess, but also on our understanding of such social 
dynamics as tribal politics, social networks, religious influences, and cultural mores. 
People, not platforms and advanced technology, will be the key to IW success.”31 
Colonel Joe Osborne, one of the principal designers for the USSOCOM global 
synchronization process and methodology, frames IW in this way: 
It is a concept and philosophy properly considered in the strategic context 
that allows us to apply capabilities holistically to achieve desired effects. 
Its most unique characteristics are the focus on the relevant populations, 
support to sovereign partners and a linkage to our shared interests. It is a 
DoD activity not limited to SOF or dependent on a state of war.32   
The protracted nature of IW favors our adversaries; they do not have to defeat us—only 
out-last us.  This is not a new concept; our own history during the American Revolution 
reveals a penchant for IW, with our forebears having won freedom despite never winning 
a major battle against the British in the South.   
In CSBA’s “Strategy for the Long Haul” series, Senior Fellow Robert Martinage 
specifically examines “Future Challenges and Opportunities” for Special Operations 
Forces.  Martinage identifies three strategic challenges for the U.S.: 1) continued 
terrorism in the form of violent Islamic-based radicalism; 2) aggressive posturing and 
attitudes by rising military powers and authoritarian regimes which seek to compete 
militarily with the U.S. (i.e., China, Russia, Iran); and 3) proliferation of Weapons of 
                                                 
30  Irregular Warfare (IW) Joint Operating Concept (JOC) Version 1.0, produced by the DoD, 11 
September 2007, defines IW as a violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and 
influence over the relevant populations.  IW favors indirect and asymmetric approaches, though it may 
employ the full range of military and other capabilities, in order to erode an adversary’s power, influence, 
and will.   
31  Irregular Warfare (IW) Joint Operating Concept (JOC) Version 1.0, DoD, 11 September 2007, 1. 
32  Joseph E. Osborne (Colonel, US Army), “Beyond Irregular Warfare: A Strategic Concept for 
Countering Irregular Adversaries and Engagement in Complex Security Environments,” Small Wars 
Journal Op-Ed, 11 February 2009, http://smallwarsjournal.com/mag/docs-temp/184-osborne.pdf (accessed 
3 March 2009). 
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Mass Destruction (WMD).33  Although the U.S. cannot face these future challenges 
alone, it is also understood that we need to restructure our current force posture and some 
elements of our modus operandi.  According to Martinage, “In order to prepare for a 
future security environment defined by these challenges, SOF will need to shift from an 
episodic deployment force to a persistent-presence force, with more units forward in 
more places for longer periods of time.” 34 
Martinage points out that the campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan are absorbing the 
preponderance of SOF personnel and resources right now—80 percent between the two 
countries.  I believe this constitutes a massive misallocation of assets which has left the 
U.S. vulnerable to emerging threats and competitors throughout the world.  We no longer 
have the eyes and ears forward—the human presence—to identify potential “hot spots” 
around the globe.  Martinage argues: “An on-the-ground presence is essential not only for 
collecting tactical intelligence and developing local situational awareness, but also for 
supporting partner security forces and responding rapidly if and when high-value terrorist 
targets are identified and located.”35 
The last three decades have seen a significant investment in technology (satellites, 
F–22 Raptors, F–35 Joint Strike Fighters, and the Army’s Future Combat System, to 
name only a few), while relatively little money has been invested in the human 
factor/elements, such as the procurement of Human Intelligence (HUMINT).  Of the 18 
programs in the 2008 military budget that were allocated more than $1 billion, only three 
are actively employed in our current theaters of operation.36  More than five years ago, 
MG Robert Scales Jr. (U.S. Army Retired) argued that too many within the military 
viewed transformation exclusively as a technological challenge: 
                                                 
33  Robert Martinage, “Special Operations Forces: Future Challenges and Opportunities,” CSBA 
Publication: Strategy for the Long Haul, 17 November 2008, 25. 
http://www.csbaonline.org/4Publications/PubLibrary/R.20081117.Special_Operation_/R.20081117.Special
_Operation_.pdf (accessed 20 January 2009). 
34  Ibid., 41. 
35  Ibid., 28. 
36  See “Military Budget of the United States,” 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Military_budget_of_the_United_States (accessed on 20 February 2009). 
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So far, we have spent billions to gain a few additional meters of precision, 
knots of speed, or bits of bandwidth.  Some of that money might be better 
spent improving how our military thinks and studies, to create a parallel 
transformation based on cognition and cultural awareness.37 
In a recent speech, Defense Secretary Robert Gates outlined his thoughts on the 
future of combat: "Smaller, irregular forces—insurgents, guerrillas, terrorists—will find 
ways, as they always have, to frustrate and neutralize the advantages of larger, regular 
militaries.  And even nation-states will try to exploit our perceived vulnerabilities in an 
asymmetric way, rather than play to our inherent strengths."38  Michael Vickers echoes 
this same sentiment, “The U.S. has considerable overmatch in traditional 
capabilities…and more and more adversaries have realized it’s better to take us on in an 
asymmetric fashion.”39 
Under Gates’ direction, the country’s National Defense Strategy has 
fundamentally shifted from a focus on conventional conflicts between superpowers to a 
concern with asymmetric regional threats.  Not only has this fundamental shift been 
deemed pressing, but there has been a growing recognition that we need to embrace this 
change quickly.  Defense Secretary Gates supports this shift based on American military 
experiences over the past four decades: 
Think of where our forces have been sent and have been engaged over the 
last 40- plus years: Vietnam, Lebanon, Grenada, Panama, Somalia, Haiti, 
Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq, the Horn of Africa and more…. In 
fact, the first Gulf War stands alone in over two generations of constant 
military engagement as a more or less traditional conventional conflict.40 
                                                 
37  Robert H. Scales (MG, US Army – retired), “Culture-Centric Warfare,” The Naval Institute: 
Proceedings, October 2004. 
38  Josh White, “Defense Secretary Urges Military to Mold Itself to Fight Iraq-Style Wars,” 
Washington Post, 14 May 2008, 4.  
39  Ann Scott Tyson, “U.S. To Raise ‘Irregular War’ Capabilities,” Washington Post, 4 December 
2008, 4. 
40  Ibid. 
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As Secretary Gates rightly points out, “We do not have the luxury of opting out because 
they [insurgents and extremist groups] do not conform to preferred notions of the 
American way of war.”41   
Meanwhile, if our focus is no longer completely on China and Russia, but on the 
various terrorist/extremist networks that continue to operate and grow in weak or failing 
states, how do we develop counter-networks to monitor, isolate, disrupt and destroy these 
violent radicals?  Invariably, the solution demands or favors an irregular military 
approach, utilizing both direct and indirect methods of operation. 
B. FROM PERSISTENT TO PERMANENT PRESENCE 
It was prescient of the late General Wayne Downing to stipulate over a decade 
ago that the future would require the unique and varied skills of SOF personnel.  “SOF 
must be prepared to move into appropriate emerging mission areas where there is 
currently a gap in our national defense capabilities.”42  While General Downing may not 
have meant “move” in the literal sense, this thesis takes his admonishment to heart.  I 
agree with the various policy makers, scholars and warriors who advocate a persistent 
presence as the U.S. conducts protracted global operations.  I simply extend the notion by 
arguing for a permanent presence, vis-à-vis a new rotational concept.   My premise is that 
SF soldiers should be deployed forward in a permanent OCONUS presence and 
engagement role. 
By being engaged in a permanent forward presence posture throughout the world, 
Special Forces soldiers would once again achieve positive strategic results, exactly what 
they were designed to do.  Special Forces soldiers are trained and groomed to serve as 
warrior-diplomats.  As previously mentioned, they possess unique skills, to include but 
not limited to: language proficiency, regional orientation, interpersonal capabilities, as 
well as political and cultural sensitivities gained through experience and in-depth study.  
                                                 
41  Ann Scott Tyson, “U.S. To Raise ‘Irregular War’ Capabilities,” Washington Post, 4 December 
2008, 4. 
42   Wayne A. Downing, USA General (Ret.), Challenges of the Future, aptly titled foreword for the 
book entitled The Roles and Missions of Special Operations Forces in the Aftermath of the Cold War, 
edited by Richard H. Shultz, Jr., Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., and W. Bradley Stock, 1994, 3. 
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The typical SF soldier is older and more mature and, as a result, is capable of making 
well-informed independent decisions.  Finally, and maybe most important for our present 
and future conflicts, SF soldiers are specifically trained in understanding and developing 
human intelligence.   
Given all of the time and effort spent training, educating, and testing SF soldiers 
on the above skills, they are under-utilized whenever they are deployed out of context.  
Operational Detachment Alpha—Teams (ODAs) offer the ultimate economy of force to 
gain very deep knowledge—essentially human intelligence—of foreign cultures, 
languages, and societies, awareness that is critical to effectively understanding and 
operating in a specific area.  The only true way to gain this human intelligence, which is 
essential to effectively combating networked terrorist organizations, is via complete and 
total immersion.  An individual has to eat, sleep, and live in another society before he 
truly understands the people and culture, and/or—more importantly—before the people 
of that society truly trust and believe that person well enough to confide in him. 
Establishing a permanent global presence would allow the U.S. to acquire the 
necessary ground intelligence about our adversaries, as well as build partner capacity for 
long-term host nation and U.S. interests.  The “Supporting Ideas” section of the IW JOC 
draws attention to the problems that occur when there is too much turnover:   
Periodic short-duration deployments to at-risk states will be an inadequate 
operational approach to IW because the results of these deployments will 
be quickly reversed by adversary countermeasures and by the inertia 
common in failed and failing states.43 
Some policymakers and senior ranking officers seem to feel that SOF’s current 
rotational force posture and structure are adequate for accomplishing the mission at hand.  
The Honorable Thomas W. O’Connell, for instance, testified:  
 
 
                                                 
43  Irregular Warfare (IW) Joint Operating Concept (JOC) Version 1.0, DoD, 11 September 2007, 22. 
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With a shift from SOF being postured for reactive, regional contingencies 
to being a global, proactive and preemptive force, we are witnessing a key 
evolution in how we must conduct our security affairs in the future and 
address those ungoverned spaces and build capacity to deal with those 
who would harm our country.44 
USSOCOM’s initiative, detailed in its 2007 Posture Statement, focuses on a 
Global SOF Posture (GSP) with a ‘Presence for Purpose,’ thus supporting the notion of a 
continuous rotational presence of SOF personnel through areas deemed strategic.  The 
Foreign Area Officers (FAO) and Defense Attaché (DAT) programs, Military Liaison 
Elements (MLEs), Interagency Intelligence personnel, Security Assistance Training 
Management Organization (SATMO), and Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCETs) 
exercises all serve as examples of a limited forward presence.  But I would argue that 
these efforts only scratch the surface—temporarily alleviating the itch.   
First, you can never determine with any degree of certainty where the next ‘hot 
spot’ will be, so you must have eyes and ears spread globally at all times.  Second, 
rotational deployments do not afford an individual adequate immersion to develop the 
necessary levels of local insight or the trust required to develop true partners and 
dependable allies.  Rotational deployments create generalists, when what we currently 
need are experts on particular areas when it comes to dealing with particular people(s).  
As Edward Luttwak noted two decades ago, when addressing SF’s participation in low-
intensity wars: 
One hopes, we would no longer see even the smallest military assistance 
groups shared  out between the different Services and we would no longer 
see the constant renewal of inexperience by the senseless enforcement of 
the principle of rotation even in cases where unique expertise vital for 
continuity is thereby dissipated.45    
 
                                                 
44  Thomas W. O’Connell, private consultant on defense matters and former Assistant Secretary of 
Defense for Special Operations/ Low Intensity Conflict, presenting a statement at a hearing before the 
Terrorism, Unconventional Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services 
House of Representatives, 8 March 2006. 
45  Edward N. Luttwak, “Notes on Low-Intensity Warfare,” Parameters, December 1983, 342.   
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There is no question that the permanent presence of SF soldiers that I am 
advocating would require a complete and total career commitment to living abroad.  SF 
Groups in their entirety, to include everything from operational line items to families, 
would be forward deployed OCONUS.  The Group HQ would act as the hub or base for 
that Group’s particular region.  Battalions, companies, and teams would be further spread 
throughout the geographical region to form a web of interconnections that would help 
provide the global coverage we currently lack.  Under such a rubric, the roles and posture 
of SF would change, but the seven primary missions would essentially remain the same.  
This concept will be discussed in more detail in Chapter V. 
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IV. PEOPLE BEFORE PLATFORMS 
What we really need is probably a special forces – not commandos, but 
rather people who are thinking through the kind of environment they are 
going to fight in and who have enough intelligence information to do the 
proper things.  We have enormous problems knowing the areas in which 
we are going to fight.46 
—Rowan Scarborough 
A. INDIVIDUAL CRITERIA 
In thinking about my idea for a permanent global presence, I often wondered 
whether a special type of individual would have to step forward to fill this role.  Would it 
be necessary for the operators I envision to possess the adventurous spirit, intellect, and 
drive of men like T.E. Lawrence, John Glubb Pasha, and Edward Lansdale of previous 
generations?  Would it be necessary to re-design the selection process to identify such 
individuals?  I believe the answer to these questions is no.  In my view we currently have 
such individuals in the force, and the SF selection process is working perfectly fine to 
identify them.  Special Forces Assessment and Selection (SFAS) and the Qualification 
Course for Special Forces continue to identify the right capabilities, temperament, and 
personality in soldiers entering the regiment.   
SF has always attracted a certain type of person—mentally flexible and capable of 
operating in an ambiguous environment with little to no supervision.  While many do not 
attempt to join SF because of the physical demands placed on the individual, it is the 
mental strain of having to be innovative in a decentralized and unstructured environment 
that makes a person prefer to stay home.  One of the greatest initial criteria for selection 
has historically been the self-selection process.  Unfortunately, we may have degraded 
this criterion over the past few years in an attempt to grow the force faster than normal. 
 
 
                                                 
46  Rowan Scarborough, “Pentagon Eyes Cut, Peacekeeping Focus: Army, Air Force May Suffer 
Most,” Washington Times, 13 December 1996, A1/A14.   
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By being completely honest about what a career in a forward deployed SF unit would 
entail, self-selection would once again assist SF to find exactly the people needed.  Self-
selection would once again serve its purpose as an essential initial assessment tool. 
The often unenviable position and role of a military spouse would also have to be 
taken into consideration.  While military wives would no longer have to deal with the 
rotational absence of their husbands, they would have to accept the realities of living in a 
foreign country.  A career abroad has obvious impacts on a family, which in turn would 
require a different kind of self, or self-and-family, assessment as an individual enters the 
SF pipeline.  But these considerations would not necessarily be different from those given 
today to diplomatic families assigned abroad.  I believe the types of individuals already 
attracted to SF bring with them families who would, more often than not, embrace a 
career spent OCONUS.    
The stabilizing effect of family presence would be of added benefit in other ways.  
Not only would ODA’s “get” to stay abroad longer  without risking losing their families 
to the stresses of long absences, but temporary duty assignments can sometimes appear to 
host nation personnel as if 12 guys are showing up for “fun” and adventure.  Having 
families present would signal an altogether different degree—and seriousness of—
“commitment.” 
B. SUSTAINED SFA 
What, meanwhile, would these SF units do abroad?  The current DoD emphasis 
on Security Forces Assistance (SFA) would be integrated as part of the mission of these 
permanently engaged SF personnel throughout the world.47  Essentially, SFA entails 
empowering local governments through the development of their security forces, to 
include all constabulary, military, and para-military forces.   
                                                 
47  The Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance (JCISFA) defines SFA as, “Unified 
action by the joint, interagency, intergovernmental and multinational community to generate, employ, 
sustain and assist host nation or regional security forces in support of a legitimate authority. SFA is a broad 
framework that spans the spectrum of conflict focused on assisting foreign security forces in support of 
U.S. and Coalition interests regardless of operating environment.”  https://jcisfa.jcs.mil/Index.aspx 
(accessed 21 January 2009). 
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Arguably the most important military component in the war on terror is 
not the fighting we do ourselves, but how well we enable and empower 
our partners to defend and govern their own countries.48    
Foreign security forces need to be developed across the full spectrum of 
operations.  This is particularly critical in failing or emerging nation-states to prepare 
them to defend themselves against all internal and external enemies.  The end result 
should be the establishment of a professional, fully capable, and self-sustaining set of 
security forces.   
Currently, many regional stabilization efforts across the globe occur under the 
label of SFA.  Upon returning from Iraq in August of 2008, John Nagl, retired Lieutenant 
Colonel and Senior Fellow at the Center for a New American Security—well known for 
his academic work on COIN—stressed SFA as a “critical component” for the wars in Iraq 
and Afghanistan.49  As Nagl puts it, “Indigenous security forces have greater legitimacy 
with the local population than external forces, and they understand the social networks in 
which they operate.”50  SFA assists willing nations to be able to police their respective 
territories.  SF soldiers have been undertaking such training and advising missions since 
SF’s inception, and could easily expand their current mission set to include these 
additional SFA responsibilities.     
Foreign Internal Defense (FID) has long been a primary mission for SF and rests 
at the core of stability operations.51  Providing assistance through training, advising, and 
equipping foreign militaries in order to deal with threats to their Internal Defense and 
                                                 
48  Robert Gates, Secretary of Defense, speech given at the annual conference of the Association of the 
US Army in Washington, 10 October 2007.   
49  Defense News Stand.com, “Pentagon Leaders Eye SOCOM to Lead Foreign Security Forces 
Training,” 18 August 2008.  http://defensenewsstand.com/newsstand_search.asp?ACTION=RETURN  
50  Ibid. 
51  FM 3-05 (FM 100-25), Army Special Operations Forces, September 2006, 2-5, defines Foreign 
Internal Defense (FID) as participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the 
action programs taken by another government or designated organization to free and protect its society 
from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. 
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Development (IDAD) has been a core SF strength.  SFA pushes this mission one step 
further by taking into consideration the external threats that a foreign military faces.52   
There is a great deal of overlap between the responsibilities inherent in FID and 
SFA in that they both seek to develop cooperative security agreements with foreign 
partners.  Also, they both enable and illustrate the commitment of the U.S. and send a 
clear global signal.  We will never be able to police or operate in other countries as well 
as their own citizens can.  Ultimately, if our main aim is to build partnership capacity 
while generating good will and mutual trust, it is hard to imagine a more parsimonious 
way to do this than via the permanent embedding of SF in communities abroad.  More 
significantly, the permanent presence I am arguing for would illustrate by deed American 
commitment, and would begin to rebuild the trust and confidence we need faster than 
anything else we could do.   
An Additional Bonus: As time passes and relationships are fortified, the 
opportunity might arise for SF to recruit and integrate indigenous forces from the region 
to operate in its same capacity.  This would only emerge as a possibility with permanent 
presence, as it would take years to be able to identify and vet the right local nationals.  
Note: clearly, this could only be done with the host nation’s approval.  Chances are this 
would become most useful for vetting and recruiting refugees from countries that are 
denied to us—much as Detachment 101 recruited Burmese and Anglo-Burmese in Indian 
refugee camps for operations in occupied Burma.  Historical precedence exists for 
assimilation of foreign nationals into SF; one need only think back to the Lodge Act.53  
Specific safeguards were emplaced back then involving personnel quotas, requisite skill 
sets, and marital status.  Equally stringent measures could be emplaced today.  As several 
                                                 
52  A more detailed argument is presented by Major David Jenkins, “Distinguishing Between Security 
Force Assistance & Foreign Internal Defense: Determining A Doctrine Road-Ahead,” Small Wars Journal, 
http://smallwarsjournal.com/mag/docs-temp/146-jenkins.pdf (accessed 22 January 2009).   
53  The Act was pushed through Congress by Massachusetts Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr. during 
the Cold War, in an attempt to recruit Eastern European nationals to form infiltration units working in that 
part of the world.  The Lodge-Philbin Act – a U.S. law passed on 30 June 1950, allowed for recruiting 
foreign nationals into a military force to fight under the command of the U.S. armed forces. The Act 
permitted initially up to 2,500 non-resident aliens (later expanded to allow up to 12,500) to enlist. If these 
recruits successfully served five years with an honorable discharge, they were guaranteed U.S. citizenship.  
More than 200 Eastern Europeans qualified as commandos before the Lodge Act expired in 1959.    
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people have been saying for years “By recruiting foreigners, the U.S. military could 
address its most pressing strategic deficit in the war on terrorism—lack of knowledge 
about other cultures. The most efficient way to expand the government's corps of Pashto 
or Arabic speakers isn't to send native-born Americans to language schools; it's to recruit 
native speakers of those languages.”54  Or, as Robert Martinage has argued in a slightly 
different context, “Not only will this create the conditions for a gradual reduction of the 
US military’s commitment abroad, it could also facilitate more effective Counter 
Terrorism [CT] operations since these partners have unmatchable advantages with respect 
to cultural intimacy and language proficiency.”55  
                                                 
54  Max Boot & Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, “Uncle Sam Wants Tu,” Council on Foreign Relations, Op-Ed 
printed in the Los Angeles Times, 24 February 2005.  http://www.cfr.org/publication.html?id=7861  
(accessed 29 January 2009). 
55  Robert Martinage, “Special Operations Forces: Future Challenges and Opportunities,” 29.  
Martinage is specifically referencing the utility of using host nation forces to conduct CT operations, not 
necessarily advocating the return of the Lodge Act.  
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V. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
The battlefield in the global counterinsurgency is intimately local; it calls 
for a “granular” knowledge of the social terrains on which it is 
competing.56   
—George Packer 
A. REGIONAL ORIENTATION 
What might be the best way for the U.S. to rebuild or establish the necessary trust 
and confidence currently missing?  The U.S. must demonstrate an uncompromising will 
and commitment to individual countries and to the global commons.  One of the main 
goals of an insurgency is to crush the will of the local government or foreign power 
which supports that government.  Our adversaries will no longer attempt to directly fight 
us in a face-to-face confrontation; they will seek to outlast the U.S., exploiting all 
possible asymmetric avenues of attack.  If you take away the will of the U.S. 
Government, populace, and service members, our adversaries are more likely to be able 
to defeat the U.S. on foreign soil.  Aligning our Special Forces with foreign militaries 
around the world will demonstrate a strong desire and resolve on the part of the U.S., a 
necessary step in defeating our enemies and rebuilding our global image.    
The 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), released just three weeks after 
9/11, outlined several responsibilities for the U.S. military, chief among them—the 
ability to execute operations in four potential hotspot regions abroad: Europe, the Middle 
East, the “Asian littoral” and Northeast Asia.  The latest QDR, released in 2006, expands 
on the need for a greater global posture: “the past four years demonstrated the need for 
U.S. forces to operate around the globe, and not only in and from the four regions.”57  
                                                 
56  George Packer, “Knowing the Enemy: Can Social Scientist’s Redefine the ‘War on Terror,’?” The 
New Yorker, 18 December 2006.  Packer conducted interviews with Australian Lieutenant Colonel David 
Kilcullen, anthropologist and Pentagon consultant Montgomery McFate, and the State Department’s 
coordinator for counter-terrorism Henry Crumpton.  Packer combines the “global counterinsurgency” 
thoughts of Kilcullen and Crumpton with the “social terrain” knowledge of McFate to indicate a potential 
way ahead for the American government.  
57  Ann Scott Tyson, “Ability to Wage ‘Long War’ Is Key to Pentagon Plan”, Washington Post, 4 
February 2006, A01. 
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Permanent presence of SF aligned with foreign militaries, demonstrating our commitment 
and embodying our national values, is the best way possible – by actual example – to 
push forward on the Long War road.  “Longer duration operations will emphasize 
building personal relationships with foreign military and security forces and other 
indigenous assets to achieve common objectives.”58   
Regionally focused permanent presence forces around the globe will take a great 
deal of time and effort to establish.  Understanding that it is important to lay an early 
foundation when dealing with foreign counterparts and partner countries, we would be 
better served to develop these relationships during times of peace than to attempt to build 
them during a time of crisis.  Trust and confidence is built over years, not months.  “The 
only Americans likely to earn lasting trust are individuals who can commit to the same 
life-long attachments locals do, and via the same methods.”59  The permanent placement 
of SF soldiers around the globe would fill the “ethnographic sensor” void that we 
currently suffer from.  Basic cultural awareness, sensitivities, and language can all be 
trained in classrooms; and with the exception of language, you can attune soldiers to most 
cultural nuances in a short pre-deployment training block.  What we truly lack is 
ethnographic intelligence, very different from customs and courtesies.  According to Dr. 
Anna Simons: 
Ethnographic Intelligence can only be put together by drilling into social 
relations and delving below patterns of association to map actual 
connections between people, frequency, and content of interactions, etc.—
all of which requires extensive time in place and training in ethnographic 
techniques.60  
 
                                                 
58  2006 QDR http://www.defenselink.mil/qdr/report/Report20060203.pdf  (accessed on 17 February 
2009).  
59 Anna Simons, “Seeing the Enemy (or Not),” Rethinking the Principles of War, ed. Anthony D. 
McIvor, (Annapolis, MD, Naval Institute Press, 2005), 323–344. 
60  Ibid. 
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1. Notional OCONUS Deployment 
Figure 1 illustrates a very small snapshot of how an abbreviated SF Group might 
establish itself in a notional region.  The Group HQ would serve as an anchor in one 
country; battalions would be pushed forward to other countries or, depending on the 
region and specific local needs, possibly co-located.  Companies and teams would be 
further decentralized and forward deployed.  Together they would yield a web of 
coverage and interconnectedness.  Clearly, some countries or regions will be non-
permissive for a variety of reasons, but this only exacerbates the need to have SF 
stationed/operating in and around these areas.  
 
 




At all levels of command, our military forces will be partnered with their 
indigenous or surrogate counterparts and will engage in mission essential tasks for these 
units.  The Ambassador and country team would help determine how to mesh the 
Combatant Commander’s (COCOM) needs with their assessment of what would most 
benefit the country and the broader region.  The ability to work together is made much 
easier by SF teams no longer floating in and out on TDY.  The problems with 
information gaps and information flows that arise at all levels would likewise be 
diminished in scope by having a permanent and stable presence of forces providing 
continuous ground truth.   
Where national training centers exist in foreign countries, our forces will work 
with units that rotate through to spread the wealth in terms of exposure to U.S. military 
skills.  Knowledge and information about SF roles and missions in the host country will 
be made publicly available.  This is especially important since their dominant role will be 
to train with and advise Host-Nation (HN) forces for the good of the host country, and 
transparency is one of the hallmarks of a professional force. 
Once again, it is very important to note that SF will not be engaging in covert or 
clandestine operations.  As it is, it has become increasingly difficult to maintain a secret 
U.S. military presence in a foreign country for an extended period of time.  Operating in 
the open promises U.S. political leaders less ‘blowback’ should something go awry; this 
in turn would help render null any issues directly related to secrecy, cover, and 
deconflicting covert operations along with the long term trail of commitments  they 
generate.  If a situation developed whereby a classified operation was necessary, SF 
teams which have been in place for years and, having allayed suspicions about their 
activities, would be well positioned to support or execute such an operation, (Note: they 
should only be asked to do this in dire circumstances, as the result of this will most likely 
be expulsion from the region). 
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B. FORCE STRUCTURE 
The past eight years of the GWOT have weighed heavily on the force posture of 
USSF personnel.  According to Admiral Olson, “we are going to fewer countries, staying 
for shorter periods of time, with smaller numbers of people than historically we have 
done.”61  With the preponderance of forces deployed to Central/South Asia, SF is losing 
its global situational awareness and ability to establish vital partnerships with foreign 
allies.  Permanently stationing SF personnel abroad would increase our ability to see 
early indicators or warnings of potential problems and address them via the appropriate 
response prior to their becoming major crises.  For all the reasons already cited, 
permanent presence would allow us to foster dependable relationships with foreign 
partners; but, to facilitate this would require a more sensible theater re-alignment.  
In an effort to meet the current demands of the WOT, OIF & OEF force 
requirements have severely strained all active and National Guard SF Groups.  The strain 
and OP-tempo have forced all of the Groups to split their focus between two theaters, and 
one Group has been completely shifted to a new Area of Responsibility (AOR) 
altogether.62  A realignment of all five active SF Group Headquarters, with a permanent 
presence and force structure appropriate for each AOR, would allow the U.S. to meet 
emerging strategic threats globally and on a consistent basis.  Not every Group would or 
should need to have the same operational focus, structure and manning, (see Table 1), as 
every region does not present the same array of by, with and through challenges.  This 
table outlines one possible re-orientation and allocation of personnel and equipment 
necessary to fill the force requirements for a regionally oriented and globally postured 
Special Force:     
                                                 
61  Eric T. Olson, USN Admiral, SOCOM Commander, comment made during his first interview as 
SOCOM Commander, Associated Press, SOCOM Says Forces Spread Thin, 6 May 2008. 
62  3rd SFG(A) has historically been responsible for Africa.  With the advent of the WOT, 3rd Group 
has had to completely shift regions to become the lead proponent for Afghanistan, normally falling under 
the 5th SFG(A) umbrella of coverage, in order to allow 5th Group to focus on operations in and around 
Iraq.  While small contingents of 3rd Group soldiers have participated in several missions to Africa since 
the WOT began, it is clearly evident that Afghanistan is the Group’s primary focus.  10th SFG(A) has 
assumed the preponderance of missions in Africa.   I would be remiss if I did not mention that all five 
remaining SFGs have played key roles in OIF and OEF while still maintaining coverage and presence in 
their respective AORs.   
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Group AOR Force 
Structure 
Mission Focus 
1st East Asia 5 Battalions COIN/ UW/ FID & SFA/ CP of WMD 
3rd Africa 4 Battalions COIN/ UW/ CT/ FID & SFA 
5th West Africa 5 Battalions COIN/ UW/ CT/ FID & SFA/ CP of WMD 
7th Latin America 3 Battalions COIN/ Counter-narcotics/ UW/ CT/ FID & SFA 
10th Europe 3 Battalions COIN/ FID & SFA 
Table 1.   Future Force Structure & Mission 
 
Each SF Group HQ would have a battalion co-located with it in its respective 
AOR.  This attached battalion, which would include the Combatant Commander’s In-
extremis Force (CIF), would not be directly involved with the postured units serving in a 
permanent presence role.  The co-located battalion would be tasked with several 
responsibilities: 1) act as a necessary theater reaction force; 2) assist and reinforce the 
permanently postured teams with training and emerging missions; and 3) execute 
whatever extraneous missions arise at the discretion of the Group Commander and 
Geographic Combatant Commander (GCC); this would include the ongoing combat 
operations in OIF and OEF.   
For illustrative purposes, I will describe the utilization of SF personnel in two 
separate geographical areas or Group AORs.  The intent of this portion of the thesis is to 
sketch a hypothetical application of the permanent presence concept.  To outline how an 







consultation with regional subject matter experts and representatives from the interagency 
(e.g., DOS, CIA, etc.).  The significance of this exercise is largely to highlight how the 
permanent presence approach might work in practice.63 
1. 3rd Special Forces Group 
The AOR for all four battalions of 3rd SFG would be the entire African continent.  
The importance of Africa in relation to U.S. security interests has been on the rise.  As 
Rear Admiral Richard Hunt, the Commander of Combined Joint Task Force—Horn of 
Africa (CJT-HOA) explained in 2007: "Africa is the new frontier that we need to engage 
now, or we are going to end up doing it later in a very negative way."64  Piracy off the 
eastern coast of Africa and terrorist groups allegedly utilizing under-governed areas in the 
Horn of Africa to transport personnel, weapons, and drugs create considerable security 
issues for the U.S.  
While the former Bush Administration is viewed positively by a large majority of 
Africans (since it gave more aid to Africa than any previous administration), the Obama 
Administration is viewed with even greater optimism.65  President Obama has enormous 
social and political capital at home and abroad.  This could be put to great use in Africa.  
Working with the African Union towards the cessation of internal conflict and wars 
would ultimately serve in the best interests of the U.S. and world writ large.  Stability is 
well recognized as an essential tool for any type of development and progress.  Phillip 
Carter, Acting Assistant Secretary for the Bureau of African Affairs within the 
                                                 
63  It should be added that I have never served in either theater.  Nor do I have much more than cursory 
knowledge of the geo-political environment in these regions.  Whether the countries I discuss would allow 
expanded U.S. representation in the form of a permanent SF presence is an issue to be worked out by senior 
military officials and the Department of State.  Political and military experts commonly agree that the 
solution to our current WOT requires all elements of national power–armed force in conjunction with 
political, economic, and informational operations.  I, clearly, am only focusing on SF’s capabilities, and not 
SF in conjunction with other elements of national power, which would be a key consideration for DoD, 
DoS, country teams in embassies, etc. 
64  Frida Berrigan, “The New Military Frontier: Africa,” Foreign Policy in Focus, 18 September 2007. 
http://www.fpif.org/fpiftxt/4561 (accessed 15 April 2008).  
65  According to ABC News article: Will Obama Give Africa More Than Just Pride?–Africa was a 
priority under former President Bush. His administration directed more money to the continent 
than any before it, with the United States allocating more than $5 billion a year in aid by the end of 
Bush's second term.  http://abcnews.go.com/International/President44/story?id=6711854&page=1  
(accessed 13 April 2009). 
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Department of State, recently spoke of the current administration’s initiative and strategy 
to operate more effectively in a world where non-state actors and illegal trans-border 
activity can pose major threats to even the most powerful of countries.  “The goal is to 
develop a network of well-governed states capable through responsible sovereignty of 
protecting themselves and contributing to regional security.”66   
Unfortunately, AFRICOM has been viewed by many Africans as an attempt by 
the U.S. to apply an imperialistic agenda.  The fear is that the U.S. wants to militarize 
Africa under the auspices of the WOT in order to gain access to key regions in an effort 
to preempt potential threats.  Emeka Chiakwelu, Principal Policy Strategist at the Africa 
Political and Economic Strategic Center, argues that the:     
American government has set-up AFRICOM—a military command for 
Africa, which is to secure peace and goodwill in Africa. Many African 
countries are skeptical of America's real intention, fearing that AFRICOM 
can become a tool to punish America's foes in the region in the name of 
fighting terrorism. The unexpressed fear is that it could be used to control 
and manipulate internal policies and the status quo of African nations.67 
Although AFRICOM is viewed negatively by many countries within the African 
Union, there is still a large measure of U.S. involvement in the strategic development of 
some African militaries.  These militaries have become dependent on private-sector U.S. 
corporations to assist in the training and development of military missions and strategy 
with respect to the national security interests of their country.  One such example is 
Military Professional Resources Incorporated (MPRI) and the work it has done with the 
Nigerian government to design a force structure and strategy to meet future needs and 
combat potential adversaries.  According to the African Unification Front: 
 
MPRI, sponsored by the U.S. Agency for International Development 
(USAID) and the Office of Transition Initiatives (INEC), assists the 
                                                 
66  Phillip Carter, III, Acting Assistant Secretary for the Bureau of African Affairs gave a talk on U.S. 
Policy in Africa in the 21st Century at The Africa Center for Strategic Studies in Washington, DC on the 9th 
of February 2009.  http://www.state.gov/p/af/rls/rm/2009/117326.htm (accessed 13 April 2009). 
67  Emeka Chiakwelu, Principal Policy Strategist at the Africa Political and Economic Strategic 
Center, The Obama Administration: The Policy for Nigeria and Africa, 1 March 2009. 
http://www.modernghana.com/news/204352/1/the-obama-administration-the-policy-for-nigeria-an.html. 
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Nigerian state government and the military in developing institutional 
knowledge as to how the military will interact with its civilian leaders, 
how to formulate and present a budget to the National Assembly and the 
basic administrative tasks that go into running an efficient military.68 
a. Nigeria 
Nigeria is the most populous and prosperous nation in Africa, with the 
largest military, a constitution, civilian democratic government, and natural resources 
rivaled only by South Africa.  Exploiting large oil reserves in the Gulf of Guinea, Nigeria 
now exports a large quantity of oil to Europe and North America.  Given Nigeria’s size 
and population, it exudes a great deal of influence over West Africa and is well 
positioned to lead Africa politically, culturally, and economically in the 21st century.69  
That being said, religious tensions and rifts exist between Muslims and Christians (the 
country is almost evenly split); the military has been neglected for some time; and 
corruption is still rampant throughout the political system.  Criminal activity is rife as 
Nigeria remains a transit point for narco-traffickers pushing shipments of illicit drugs to 
all parts of the world, including the U.S.70  Given all of this, the U.S. cannot afford for 
democracy in Nigeria to fail or for Nigeria to slip further toward lawlessness – not when 
there is already so much instability in the region.   
Professionalization of the military is an essential first step in assisting a 
young democracy to continue to promote the rule of law.  The permanent presence of SF 
personnel will have immediate benefits for the Nigerian Military.  One SF ODA, 
representing an extremely small footprint, can be stationed at the Infantry Corps Center 
and Training School in Jaji, Kaduna.  Partnered with the school house cadre for Guerilla 
Warfare Training, SF personnel can mentor, teach, and train at all levels within this 
curriculum.  Training and U.S. involvement would help facilitate, if not ensure more 
classes on Human Rights and other subjects critical for a country and region where 
militaries are held in low regard due to past offenses and abuses.  Working with all 
                                                 
68  African Unification Front, http://www.africanfront.com/index.php (accessed 14 April 2008).   
69  CIA World Fact Book, 2008.  https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/geos/ni.html (accessed 13 April 2009). 
70  Ibid. 
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soldiers as they make their way through this arduous training would prove invaluable for 
building rapport and establishing long term relationships with some of the best and 
brightest within the Nigerian Military.  Also, this same military training facility in 
Nigeria extends it sphere of influence by offering slots to Africans from other countries, 
providing yet another opportunity for SF to build relationships, rapport, and contacts.71 
b. Botswana 
Botswana has capitalized on two of its most valuable resources, diamonds 
and tourism.  Impressive economic gains have transformed Botswana over the past 
decade from one of the poorest countries in the world to a “middle-income” country.72  
Extensive nature preserves and wildlife habitats generate money from tourism, while 
diamonds mined throughout the country serve as the chief export and primary source of 
capital.  Botswana does not have nearly the same level of corruption and criminal activity 
as Nigeria, but it is plagued by one of the world’s highest known rates of HIV/AIDS.  As 
the HIV pandemic continues to evolve, the Botswana Defense Force (BDF) will have to 
harbor its manpower (its own HIV rates are substantial) and make the best possible use of 
its personnel to assist with the country’s development.      
The BDF is comprised of only a small Army or Ground Force with an 
attached Air Wing.  On a continent where most national militaries are held in contempt, 
the BDF is held in high regard by Botswanans, and by the U.S.  According to a White 
House fact sheet, "the BDF is one of the most professional military forces in Africa and 
has participated successfully in peacekeeping operations on the continent. Some two-
                                                 
71  Micahel Kpayili, “Liberia: 200 AFL Soldiers Commence Advance Military Training Courses in 
Nigeria,” The Liberian Times, 4 March 2008.  The infantry training is part of a continuous military 
assistance package offered to Liberia by the Government and people of Nigeria.  According to a Nigerian 
Defense Military release, the specialized warfare course comprises training in jungle warfare, Counter-
Terrorism, and mountain and desert warfare. The Soldiers are also expected to attend specialized courses at 
the Amphibious Training School, Calabar, South Eastern Nigeria. 
http://www.theliberiantimes.com/article_2008_03_4_3242.shtml 
72  CIA World Fact Book, 2008.  https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/geos/bc.html (accessed 13 April 2009). 
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thirds of BDF general officers have been trained in the United States."73  This positive 
perception is most likely due to the fact that Botswana’s progressive civilian leadership 
has utilized the BDF in a proactive internal security posture, mostly in an effort to 
prevent poaching of its wild game, but also in disaster preparedness.  It has also sent 
Botswanans abroad on peacekeeping missions throughout Africa.  
The small BDF is responsible for covering a vast country.  An SF 
contingent would expand the BDF’s capabilities by introducing it to more sophisticated 
communications packages and access to imagery and airframes.  Devising innovative 
ways to integrate technology into the anti-poaching effort would pay large dividends for 
both the U.S. and BDF.  Also, continued development and professionalization of the BDF 
would further enhance relationships and stability throughout Southern Africa, a region of 
the continent which has already refused to host AFRICOM.   
At current strength, the BDF has two brigades of Infantry.  One is located 
in Gaborone (the capital city), and the other in the northeast part of the country – 
Francistown.  One ODA could be located with each brigade to continue their 
development and training in a partnership capacity.  Yearly, 30 BDF officers receive 
training in various military schools throughout the U.S. through the International Military 
Education & Training (IMET) program.  Continuing to foster and develop these 
relationships can mutually benefit both countries and the sub-region.   
c. Ethiopia 
Ethiopia serves as yet another example of a developing democracy on the 
African continent.  Ethiopia does not possess the oil reserves of Nigeria or the diamond 
resources and nature preserves of Botswana, but it does occupy a key geostrategic 
location on the Horn of Africa and is willing to partner with the U.S. in our WOT.  The 
African Union Headquarters is located in the capital city, Addis Ababa, and the stationing 
of a small number of USSF within the country would be an excellent step in advancing 
 
                                                 
73  Jim Fisher-Thompson, "Botswana Looking To Join Fledgling U.S. Military Partnership," 
America.gov http://www.america.gov/st/washfile-
english/2003/July/20030711103508rehsiF0.6762964.html (accessed 24 April 2009). 
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our partnership with Ethiopia and also demonstrating our support for the African Union.  
As Philip Carter has put it, “Our first priority is providing security assistance programs 
that are critical to securing the objective of a peaceful African continent.”74   
The Ethiopian National Defense Force (ENDF) is primarily a ground force 
with an air wing (much like the BDF; both countries are land-locked).  Ethiopia was 
among the first countries in the world to deploy peacekeepers and would be well postured 
to do so again.  The Ethiopian government has been engaged in both direct and indirect 
conflicts for decades and is currently countering several insurgencies.  The ENDF has 
been actively involved in ongoing operations in Somalia to prevent the further spread of 
lawlessness and terrorist safe havens.  In an effort to support U.S. interests in the region, 
Ethiopia has allowed for a small contingent of U.S. forces to operate out of a forward 
staging base within the country.  All of these efforts make Ethiopia an excellent country 
for continued cooperation and partnership.75  SF could be partnered with the Ethiopian 
Special Forces, known as the Agazi Commandos, to continue to train and develop the 
force.  SF could also assist with offering civic action and other non-lethal population-
centric training initiatives. 
2. 7th Special Forces Group: 
The AOR for the 7th SFG would encompass Central America, Latin America, and 
the Caribbean.  In order to distribute the forces appropriately throughout the region, this 
area should probably be broken down into three main geographical regions: 1) the 
Andean Ridge, (Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Bolivia, and Venezuela); 2) the Southern 
Cone, (Brazil, Argentina, Chile, Paraguay, and Uruguay); and 3) Central America and the 
Caribbean.  A number of progressive regional leaders continue to distance themselves 
from any form of U.S. military presence in their territory, so it is doubtful that Hugo 
Chavez in Venezuela or Evo Morales in Bolivia are going to want USSF partnered with 
                                                 
74  Phillip Carter, Department of State, “U.S. Policy in Africa in the 21st Century,” 9 February 2009. 
75  Some might object on human rights grounds to our partnering too closely with a government that is 
known to engage in heavy-handed tactics.  But, I would argue, that is all the more reason we should have a 
presence; otherwise, we can never mitigate such tactics or encourage Ethiopians to professionalize toward 
more acceptable international standards. 
 43
their militaries.  Current tensions between the U.S. and Ecuador over the Manta Air Base 
(which has played a vital role in the drug war), and the alleged involvement and support 
by the U.S. of the Colombian raids on FARC camps (March 2009) in the shared border 
region between Colombia and Ecuador, have strained relations even further.  Ecuador’s 
President, Rafael Correa, has vowed not to renew the Manta Air Base lease due to expire 
in November of 2009.  Also, it is hard to imagine too many families agreeing to live in 
Colombia right now; definitely none should be assigned outside of the capital.   
However, Brazil is hugely important in the region and shares a border with every 
country in South America except Chile and Ecuador (of particular note is that they do this 
without disputes).  Paraguay is very poor, and is considered to be the least stable nation in 
the region, as well as home to at least some supporters of Islamic extremism.76  Thus, if 
we were sketching one possible plan for a forward deployed 7th Group, the Group HQ, 
along with one of its three battalions, could be centrally located in Panama.  The battalion 
co-located with 7th Group’s HQ would be responsible for supplying a rapidly deployable 
theater reaction force; assisting the permanently postured teams with training and 
missions as requested; fulfilling extraneous mission requirements tasked by the Group 
Commander or COCOM; as well as covering down on Central America and the 
Caribbean as necessary.  We’ll call this 1st Battalion.   
The 2nd Battalion would be located in Brazil, with primary responsibility for the 
Southern Cone.  One company would be tasked with spreading its ODAs through 
Argentina, Paraguay, and Uruguay, as the region is not overly volatile.  2nd Battalion’s 
other two companies could be located in Brazil, with some dedicated focus to the regions 
bordering Bolivia and Venezuela.  3rd Battalion, meanwhile, would be situated in Peru, 
with responsibility for the Andean Ridge region and Chile to incorporate the eastern coast 
of Latin America.  One company might be assigned to Bogotá, one to Chile, and one to 
Peru with some dedicated focus on the border regions of Colombia, Ecuador, and Bolivia 
respectively. 
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Brazil is a major player in Latin America and serves as a significant trade 
partner with the U.S. in the Western Hemisphere.  Since it is the most populous and 
prosperous country in South America, we need to continue to develop and fortify our 
positive relations with Brazil.  An ally to the U.S. during World War II, Brazil continued 
to assist U.S. military efforts in the 1960s with operations in the Dominican Republic.  
Throughout the past decade, Brazil has continued to contribute peacekeeping forces to 
the U.N. missions in Haiti and East Timor, demonstrating its resolve and intentions to 
support global efforts. 
SF has a long-standing close relationship with the Brazilian Special 
Forces.  In 1957, an SF training team was sent to Brazil to conduct the initial training 
course for the establishment of an SF capability within the Brazilian military.  Through 
the years, this capability has developed into the 1st Special Forces Battalion, Brazil’s 
primary special operations force.77  SF could establish a presence with an ODA co-
located with the 1st SF Battalion in Guadalupe, continuing our long partnership through 
training and development of the force. 
Brazil is currently troubled with issues throughout the Amazon region of 
the country, which occupies almost half of its territory.  Narco-traffickers and narco-
guerillas have taken up residence in the region as a sanctuary from which they conduct 
illegal operations.  Criminal elements have started taking advantage of the vast resources 
within the Amazon, illegally logging, fishing, and gold-mining, not to mention smuggling 
arms, drugs, and money through the densely forested area.  Also, there have been large 
oil reserves discovered in the Amazon that could lead to further fighting and disputes if 
these are not well managed and monitored by the appropriate authorities.   
The Brazilian Army has established a Frontier Command and assigns 
Jungle Infantry Brigades the responsibility of patrolling this area.  But the enormity of the 
task is daunting for this ill-equipped force.  Jungle Operations Detachments, known 
                                                 
77  See the Brazilian Special Forces webpage for further information.  
http://www.specwarnet.net/americas/brazil_1st_sfb.htm (accessed on 12 May 2009). 
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locally as Destacamentos Operacionais de Selva (DOS), patrol this region, but its 
remoteness limits them to foot patrols.78  These detachments have been formed in the 
image of an SF ODA, with 12 highly trained infantry soldiers and 2 officers.  SF is 
ideally suited to provide them necessary technical assistance and training to enhance their 
capabilities and maximize their usefulness to the federal and state governments.  
b. Peru 
Peru has been plagued with political instability over the past five decades 
as it has transitioned from military rule, to being run by an authoritarian regime, to being 
led by democratically elected officials.  Also, like most countries throughout Latin 
America, Peru is constantly battling the production, sale, and transport of illicit 
narcotics—most notably cocaine originating from Colombia.79  Peru is also the birthplace 
for the “Shining Path” (Sendero Luminoso), an organization founded on Maoist 
principles seeking a communist/cultural revolution.  After a decade-long 
counterinsurgency struggle, Shining Path leader Abimael Guzman was captured in the 
early 1990s, but remnants of the organization still exist today and remain committed to 
their ‘revolutionary war.’ 
Over the past year Shining Path insurgents have executed successful 
ambushes resulting in the death of 32 Peruvian soldiers with 42 others wounded.  Once 
famous for promoting an austere communist agenda, the Shining Path appears to have 
shifted to criminal enterprises and the production and trafficking of cocaine.  Former 
Interior Minister Fernando Rospigliosi has labeled the counterinsurgency efforts a 
"disaster."  As he recently argued, “the lack of results in terms of rebel kills and captures 
shows that the government's strategy of taking and holding territory against the well-
                                                 
78  William W. Mendel, “The Brazilian Amazon: Controlling the Hydra,” Military Review, July-
August 1999.  http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/documents/hydra/hydra.htm (accessed 12 May 2009). 
79  CIA World Fact Book, 2008.  https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
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armed guerrillas is not working. He suggested instead that the government launch 
intelligence-supported Special Forces operations.”80   
Here is where USSF is once again ideally suited to provide the necessary 
assistance in the form of both advanced technology and sound operational training/advice 
to elements of the 1st and 3rd Special Forces Brigades in Peru.  
c. Paraguay 
One of the poorest countries in Latin America, Paraguay presents just one 
example of the all too common predicament as lack of investment in health and 
education, followed by universal hunger and unemployment, leads to criminal activities, 
and worse.   
Of concern to many political and military leaders is the tri-border area 
where Argentina-Brazil-Paraguay converges.  A combination of weak border controls; 
smuggling of weapons and drugs; and money laundering are seen as precursors for the 
development of anti-government and extremist safe-havens or bases of operation.  Navy 
Cmdr Victor Hyder, an operations officer in Special Operations Command South, has 
said, “There is a true reason for special operations forces in Paraguay, all of the networks 
that a terrorist organization could use are in place in the region.”81 
SF has been in and out of Paraguay for many years.  With a permanent 
presence it should prove even easier to develop a partnership with Paraguay so that best 
practices can be shared.  Effective development of Paraguay’s military and police 
agencies will prevent criminals and extremists from being able to take advantage of the 
under-governed tri-border region.  Unfortunately, the part-time assistance provided by the 
U.S. till now has not been sufficient, as evidenced by the annual increases in crime and 
cannabis production.  The long-term presence of SF in the region on a permanent basis 
would provide an element of much needed stability. 
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Introduction of SF personnel into their respective theaters would need to 
be slowly and carefully done.  The process may take years to develop effectively.  Every 
country is going to present unique and distinct challenges and, as such, will need to be 
treated individually to address its particular situation.  Plans will likely need to be 
modified as programs develop and events affect situations on the ground.  In many senses 
this program depends on co-evolution.  Worth noting is that as the same SF soldiers will 
be operating throughout their region for the length of their careers, the best and brightest 
members of host nation militaries will be rising through the ranks, Americans will be 
‘with’ them every step of their advancement and the mutual relationships that will be 
fostered are bound to further strengthen our partnerships. 
Ultimately, the advantage of ODAs is that they operate very quietly under 
the radar.  With such a small signature and presence in-country, media and other potential 
critics would grow used to their presence over time.  As partnerships and, ideally, 
friendships are developed, social and cultural barriers will be lowered.  The more the U.S. 
is seen to commit abroad—through its investment of soldiers and their families living 
locally—the more mutual trust this will build.  It is vital that we begin to establish these 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
According to the Petraeus Doctrine, the Army (like it or not) is entering an 
era in which armed conflict will be protracted, ambiguous, and 
continuous—with the application of force becoming a lesser part of the 
soldier’s repertoire.82 
—Andrew Bacevich 
Accepting that our current WOT is a global counterinsurgency serves as the 
foundation for understanding the importance of SF returning to its roots of operating by, 
with and through indigenous or surrogate forces and establishing a permanent presence 
abroad.  SF was designed with a specific mission and a strategic purpose, one in that is 
desperately needed in our current fight.   
The population is considered to be the target in any COIN fight.  Twentieth 
century classic counterinsurgency theorists—among them, Mao (1937), Galula (1964), 
Taber (1965), and Thompson (1968)—all talked about the importance of gaining the 
support of the populace.  Over forty years ago, David Galula wrote his lessons learned 
about COIN warfare and identified the population as a critical piece of the puzzle: 
Logic forces him [the guerilla/insurgent] to fight on a different ground 
where he has a better chance to balance the physical odds against him.  
The population represents this new ground.  If the insurgent manages to 
dissociate the population from the counterinsurgent, to control it 
physically, to get its active support, he will win the war because, in the 
final analysis, the exercise of political power depends upon the tacit or 
explicit agreement of the population or, at worst, on its submissiveness.83     
Articles are published daily in all the national papers concerning the WOT and 
how to win this fight.  At present I believe there is little disagreement among academic or 
military experts about the fact that winning the population is key.  Yet, we continue to 
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operate with and push a kinetic approach.  This approach continues to alienate us from 
the populace and drives us further from our long term goals.  Or, consider the situation 
from the locals’ point of view: 
On May 19, 2006, 24 American and 12 Afghan soldiers were traveling 
through a valley in Afghanistan’s Uruzgan province when they were 
ambushed—struck by a storm of fire from a Taliban column of 150–200 
fighters.  The most intriguing thing about the battle was the fact that many 
local farmers spontaneously joined in, rushing home to get their weapons.  
Asked later why they’d done so, the villagers claimed they didn’t support 
the Taliban’s political agenda, and they were generally well-disposed 
towards the Americans in the area, but with the battle right in front of 
them – how could they not join in?  This battle was the most exciting thing 
that had happened in their valley for years.  It would have shamed them to 
stand by and wait it out, they said.84 
This excerpt is taken from David Kilcullen’s new book Accidental Guerilla, aptly titled 
to describe how villagers and tribesmen get swept into insurgency.  It has always been 
my belief, based on multiple combat tours in Afghanistan, that the majority of fighting 
age males do not care about the establishment of an Islamic Caliphate or global jihad 
against infidels; they want to go about life in much the same manner as their fathers and 
elders have done.  They do not care about democracy or a central government; they 
respect and abide by decisions made by their village/tribal elders.  All that being said, if 
there is a fight going on down the street, then they are also not going to sit back and do 
nothing either.  They are going to join in—just as would any other young males in any 
other culture from across the globe.   
As much as the Taliban is hated and despised by most Afghanis, Americans are 
still considered to be outsiders and occupiers; and young males will always defend their 
local ways and customs from outside encroachment.85  Around the globe Americans are 
commonly viewed as imperialists; proof to some people comes in our long term 
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occupations, of Korea and Germany.  But here is also an important opportunity these 
perceptions reveal: because our enemy operates and affects/influences the youth at the 
local level, this is where we need to operate.  At the very least we need to prevent 
ourselves from creating more “accidental” guerillas.     
The image of the American as an aggressor and oppressor needs to be put to bed.  
One way to do this is to have SF soldiers and, when necessary, civilian specialists, 
physically locate and embed themselves in communities around the globe, and convey 
our true intentions by deeds, not just words.  While it is true that Americans will never be 
true members of the society where they re-locate, their coming to live and work with the 
HN military should earn them appreciation and a depth of respect that transcends the 
current world view of Americans.  A long-term sustained presence, with a small 
footprint, can convey our commitment and alleviate fears that the U.S. intends to wreak 
havoc at will.  No one is more ideally suited for such a task than SF. 
Such a shift isn’t just important to repair America’s image; it is also important for 
repairing SF.  The corporate culture has shifted within the SOF community writ large, but 
particularly within SF.  As previously mentioned, SF’s focus has become kinetic 
operations.  To our collective detriment, commanders have become too focused on DA 
missions—as this type of operation is easily quantifiable to superiors and peers alike.  In 
his book comparing counterinsurgency lessons from Vietnam and Malaya (Learning to 
Eat Soup with a Knife) Lieutenant Colonel John Nagl, U.S. Army (retired) explains the 
difficulty in transforming a traditional military mindset into one that can defeat an 
insurgency: 
Creating a political-military-economic strategy to defeat an insurgency is 
every bit as revolutionary as planning to overthrow a government, and a 
great deal more difficult.  Gerald Templar created a revolution of his own 
in Malaya.  He encouraged innovation from below and demanded a new 
approach to solving problems of Malayan society.  He not only refused to 
focus exclusively on the insurgency as a military problem, but did not 
even see it primarily as such—and he insisted that all of his subordinates 
share that worldview.86 
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Nagl cites David Lloyd Owen who recognized, “You need a man with a lot of 
imagination to run this kind of war, and one with an understanding of the political nature 
of war.”87  Gerald Templar was that man in Malaya, and, at present, the man for Iraq 
appears to be David Patreaus (time will tell).   
I believe the corporate culture in SF is on the verge of changing, as once-junior 
officers who have done multiple tours “down range” begin to rise to positions of more 
importance and rank.  Those who were young captains at the outset of the WOT are now 
entering the ranks of Battalion Command.  Given their experiences and knowledge, along 
with their growing influence, SF’s focus is bound to evolve as many are likely to 
intuitively understand, or at the very least appreciate, the importance of permanent 
presence. 
If SF underwent this shift, training would not significantly change, as SF soldiers 
will be executing the same type of missions and operations they currently conduct.  More 
emphasis would need to be placed on the importance of developing an individual’s 
linguistic capabilities, and more education would be required on specific geo-political 
environments—directly tailored to the region of orientation for the individual soldier.  
But this is what SF should be doing anyway. 
Training of a permanent presence force will require thinkers and innovators, not 
just trigger pullers.  Major General Robert H. Scales Jr., U.S. Army (retired), believes 
that transformation within the Army has been slow and overly technological; 
consequently the Army lacks the language and cultural training necessary to fight our 
“smaller” and more prevalent battles around the globe.  “Against an enemy who fights 
unconventionally, it is more important to understand motivation, intent, method and 
culture…”88  A true believer in human intelligence (HUMINT), Scales calls for a cadre of 
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global scouts.89  Technology, he argues, is no substitute for boots on the ground among 
the population.  “War is a thinking man’s game.  A military too acculturated to solving 
warfighting problems with technology alone should begin now to recognize that wars 
must be fought with intellect.”90 
Permanent presence would ultimately require a level of decentralization in the 
realm of Command and Control (C2) comparable to what SF personnel were accustomed 
to in the past.  Military and political leaders alike would have to be willing to accept more 
risk, allowing SF soldiers to do what they were trained to do, and understanding that 
soldiers and families will be more exposed than usual in foreign countries.   
From a political standpoint, integration and synchronization would be absolutely 
essential between those representing the U.S. abroad on both the military and civilian 
sides of the house.  Military and civilian authorities would need to be closely linked at all 
levels to ensure the utmost transparency and coordination regarding intent.  As so many 
people have commented, COIN is more a political fight than one designed for the 
military industrial complex.  At times, information is more essential than bullets.  
Ultimately, an ambassador working closely with the host nation government may have an 
advantage in giving guidance to military commanders on the ground—based on his 
political, not operational judgment. 
Organizational theory suggests that organizations are created to accomplish a 
certain set of missions.  Over the course of time, mission sets will slowly change to favor 
the policies that will increase the importance of a particular organization.  I believe SF 
has drifted from its initially mandated and strategic mission of UW.  “Military officers 
compete for roles in what is seen as the essence of the services’ activity rather than other 
functions where promotion is less likely… Army officers compete for roles in combat 
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organizations rather than advisory missions.”91  We haven’t forgotten our roots, but we 
have slowly drifted into a DA-focused mentality—we need to re-focus.  The importance 
and strategic utility of SF rests in the COIN domain, and its expertise lies in operations 
under the UW umbrella—operating by, with and through indigenous personnel.   
Without question, shifting to a permanent presence and engagement with foreign 
militaries and populations by SF would have a significant impact on the corporate 
culture, training, command and control, and organization of the United States Army 
Special Forces Command (USASFC).  But, as I hope I have demonstrated by describing 
this shift, it may well be necessary for success in this Long War and in the wars of our 
future, in which case it is worth figuring out now exactly how we might make the 
requisite corporate changes. 
You cannot conduct a global COIN fight on a TDY rotational basis; you must be 
intimately embedded in a society to gain the necessary trust and influence to be a tangible 
asset.  In a globalized world, people migrate—thus ideas migrate.  The U.S. must learn to 
deal with this problem in a holistic manner; our influence and representation must be 
everywhere in order to be anywhere.  The solutions developed in active partnership with 
allied nations are more likely to succeed when we work and live side by side.  Admiral 
Eric Olson, addressing a large audience in Washington at the 20th Annual Special 
Operations/Low-Intensity Conflict symposium said of SOF, “They're building long-term 
relationships in every country in every region in the world, and we need them there for a 
long time, Special Operations Forces—especially Army special operations—do this 
better than anyone.”92 
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